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CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS IN
WISCONSIN
By

JUDGE JOSEPH E. CORDES*

E

VERY court of record shall have power to punish as for a criminal
contempt.'
Chapter 256 by its title relates to, "General provisions concerning
courts of record, judges, attorneys and clerks."
2
The Civil Court of Milwaukee County is a court of record.
Sec. 15 (6) of the Civil Court Act reads: "Said Civil Court and
the judges thereof shall have the power to punish for contempt prescribed in Chapter 150 of the Statutes, and all proceedings for contempt shall be governed by the provisions of said chapter."
Chapter i5o of the statutes is now numbered 295 relating to contempts in civil actions.
Therefore, while Chapter 256 concerns all courts of record and contains sections 256.03 to 256.07 relating to criminal contempts, and the
Civil Court of Milwaukee County is a court of record, the provisions
of the act relating to contempt limit the power of the court and its
judges in contempt matters to Chapter 150 (now Chapter 295) of the
statutes and do not give jurisdiction as to so-called criminal contempts,
provided for in Chapter 256, although said chapter applies to all courts
of record, especially so, Section 256.03.
In brief, the foregoing shows that the Civil Court is a court of
record. As such it has power under Chapter 256 to punish acts as
criminal contempts, yet under Section 15 (6) of the Civil Court Act it
has power only to punish for contempts under Chapter. i5o (now Chapter 295) of the statutes and derives no power from Chapter 256.
It is easily possible to imagine a situation in which the foregoing inconsistency would be important, in fact controlling. Let me illustrate.
In State, ex rel. Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, it was held and I quote
from the syllabus first:
The power of a court to punish for contempt is an inherent and
necessary power to enforce orders and decrees, preserve order, compel
the attendance of witnesses and jurors, and to enable the court to perform the functions for which it was created.
In my opinion the holding seems correct. It would seem to apply
to any court. The power as to preserving order includes punishment
* A judge of the Milwaukee Civil Court of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin.
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for disorderly conduct or a breach of the peace committed in open
court. Such conduct would or might constitute a criminal contempt.
It might be by a person not a party to any proceeding in court. It
would not necessarily impede, imp'air, or prejudice the rights of any
party to an action and hence would not be a civil contempt or a contempt in a civil action. It seems to me the Civil Court would have inherent power to punish for such a criminal contempt, yet the Civil
Court Act restricts the contempt power to contempts in Civil actions
under Chapter i5o (now Chapter 295) of the statutes.
Later I will consider what constitutes a civil contempt or a contempt
in a civil action and what constitutes a criminal contempt, so far as
these terms can be distinguished or defined under the decisions of our
Supreme Court.
First I want to refer to the policy of the law and the courts as to
the exercise of contempt jurisdiction. In the decision in State, ex rel,
Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, on pp. 305 and 306, Justice Owen in
the majority opinion gays:
The people have not set up the courts as the instrumentalities for
declaring justice without at the same time conferring upon them ample
powers to enforce private and public rights. In order to make of the
judiciary a virile and efficient institution, which will secure justice to
every member of society, the weak as well as the strong, the poor as
well as the rich, the humble as well as the powerful, it is necessary
that courts have pover to compel respect and obedience to their orders
and decrees. For this purpose the power to punish for contempt, as
a remedial and coercive measure, is deemed an inherent and indispensable power of the courts.
In a dissenting opinion in the same case, 3 Justice Eschweiler says
in part:
I subscribe to the doctrine that the power to punish as for a crime,
that is, by imprisonment thereby restraining of his liberty one who
violates the orders of a court or flouts its dignity, is an inherent, tommon-law power of a court of justice, essential for the upholding of
its authority and maintaining its dignity and self respect.
He is speaking of criminal contempts. Then he refers to civil contempts saying, "There is no question but that a court may imprison one
who, violating its orders, thereby interferes with, impedes, defeats, or
repudiates the rights or remedies of a litigant." "These, however, are
separate, distinct and independent proceedings; one to protect the
court's dignity, the other for the protection of a litigant's property
rights."
I have been referring to the powers of courts and judges (mostly.
cou~ts) to punish for contempt.
Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, on pp. 331 and 332.
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What is the power of court commissioners in these matters? I have
already shown that the power to punish for a criminal contempt is only
conferred on courts of record by Section 256.03 of the statutes. It is
not conferred upon the circuit judge or presiding judge or any judge
in chambers or in vacation. Chapter 295 relates to contempts in civil
actions.
Section 295.01, Wisconsin Statutes, grants power to every court of
record and every judge of such court at his chambers, including the
power as to actions or proceedings before a court commissioner, in the
cases mentioned in the next eight subsections, which are a part of Section 295.
Because the power is apparently conferred upon the judge at chambers as well as upon the court, it would seem that it is likewise conferred upon a court commissioner, under the provisions of Section
252.15, Wisconsin Statutes, which states that a court commissioner
shall also have power concurrent with but not exceeding that of a judge
of the Circuit Court at chambers to punish as for contempt, disobedience of any lawful order made by himself in supplementary and other
proceedings and matters properly and lawfully instituted or pending
before him; subject, however, to review in all cases -by the Circuit
Court as provided by law and the rules and practices of the court,
except where such powers shall be exercised in an action pending in
another court of record of the county for which such court commissioner shall have been appointed and 'acting and in such case the review shall be by the court in which the action is pending.
See also Section 269.29, Wisconsin Statutes, as to when Court Commissioner may act.
His power is therefore concurrent with, but not exceeding that of a
circuit judge at chambers.
We must therefore consider the extent of the power of a judge of
the Circuit Court at chambers.
Section 295, Wisconsin Statutes, by itself appears to grant the power
to a circuit judge at chambers in all of the instances specified in the
eight subsections of Section 295.
As a matter of fact such broad power is not conferred because it is
4
limited by the following sections in the chapter.
The only instances in which the circuit judge at chambers can punish
for contempt are those specified in Sections 295.02 and 295.03. In all
other insfances he must make the order to show cause or attachment
returnable before the court.
Section 295.02 relates to summary punishment for misconduct in the
immediate view and presence of the court.
4Sec.

295. Wis. Stat.
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Section 295.03 relates to an order of the court or judge requiring the
payment of costs or any other sum of money and proof by affidavit of
a personal demand, including orders for payment of money in divorce
cases without pioof of demand, there being proof of personal service
of the order and refusal to pay.
Section 295.04 provides that in a case specified in Sections 295.02
and 295.03 the court may, in its discretion, as in all other cases, either
make an order to show cause or issue an attachment to bring the offender before the court. The order to show cause or attachment may
be made or issued by a judge in vacation, but must be made returnable
to the court.
Section 295.12 requires that the court shall cause interrogatories to
be filed and shall determine whether the defendant has been guilty of
the misconduct alleged.
Section 295.13 relates to judgment by the court.

Section 295.14 requires the finding of indemnity or imposition of fine
to be by the court.
Under Section 295.18 proceedings on default are by the court and
under Section 295.20 an action on the undertaking for appearance
is to be ordered by the court.
A failure of a judgment debtor to appear upon order in supplementary proceedings, likewise a failure of a witness, garnishee defendant or probably even a juror to appear is not misconduct committed within the immediate view and presence of the court, hence not
included in Section 295.02; neither is the failure to appear in answer
to an order requiring the payment of costs or other sum of money provtded for in Section 295.03, therefore such failure to appear is not
punishable summarily by a judge in chambers or by a court commissioner. The order to show cause or attachment to punish for contempt
for such failure to appear must be made returnable to the court under
the provisions of Section 295.04. A court commissioner or judge in
chambers cannot punish for contempt for any of the offenses assumed
in this paragraph.
If anyone does not agree with this conclusion it would seem that it
must be admitted that the power of the court commissioner in such
situation is at least doubtful. I haven't found any case in the Wisconsin reports arising out of a commitment for contempt by a court com5
missioner, except that of In re Remington. Justice Cole wrote the
decision of the court and said:
That a court commissioner-a mere appointee of the Circuit Court
-can attach a citizen and imprison him summarily, at his own pleasure, for a contempt, without any reference even to Chapter 115 revised
7 Wis., 541, Star paging 643, decided in 1858.
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Statutes is certainly a most extraordinary position. Now, I deny in
toto the power of a court commissioner to punish for contempt, even
in a matter where he has full and ample jurisdiction. I shall dismiss
the whole matter here, without further suggestions; it will be time
enough to examine the question, when some law is cited. that gives him,
or professes to give him, that high authority; for that, by involved implication, it can be made to appear that a court commissioner can exercise this high discretionary power of punishing as for a contempt by
imprisonment a citizen who disobeys his orders-a power usually jealously guarded arid hedged in by strong legal enactments which the wisdom and experience 6f centuries in this country and England have
proved necessary to prevent 'abuse, and secure the liberties of citizens,
when it is exercised by the highest judicial tribunals-that a court
commissioner can rightly exercise this power without its being conferred upon him by law, I do not believe. I cannot admit it until I
see an act conferring it upon him in the clearest and most unequivocal
manner.
Referring to the power of a court commissioner to punish, as for
contempt, a disobedience of an order made by him, Justice Cole says:
"A power, I venture to say, never exercised by any circuit judge in
this state in chambers, and a power which no circuit judge could properly exercise at chambers, unless it was clearly conferred upon him
by law."7
In Haight v. Lucia, 36 Wis., 355, decided in 1874, a court commissioner granted an injunctional order, which was violated by defendants.
He issued an order to show cause why they should not be punished
for contempt. This was disregarded and he then issued an attachment
returnable before the court, by virtue of which they were arrested and
held to bail for their appearance at the Circuit Court to answer for
their alleged contempt.
Lyon, J. says:
We have reached the conclusion that a court commissioner has no
power to issue an attachment against the person in a case like the
one before us. The power is claimed to exist by virtue of the statutory provision, conferring upon court commissioners the authority of
a judge of the Circuit Court at chambers, in civil actions. We will
not now decide whether, in a case like this, the circuit judge may award
an attachment in vacation p. 359.'
The case of In re Remington, 7 Wis., 643, is referred to and it is
said, "subsequently the legislature conferred upon court commissioners
the powers there denied them,9 and referring to contempt committee in
proceedings supplementary to execution.
*Ibid.
*Ibid.

'Haight v. Lucia, 36 Wis., 355.
Laws of 86o, Ch. 44, p. 359. (Taylor Statutes 1864, Sections ioo to 113.)
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Paragraph 2 of ,the syllabus" reads:
Court commissioners have no power to issue attachments for contempt except in those cases (as in proceedings supplementary to execution) where the power is expressly conferred upon them by statute.
By present statutes as already shown the power of the court commissioner does not exceed that of a circuit judge at chambers, and the
power of a circuit judge at chambers is very much restricted by Chapter 295 of the statutes.
In State ex rel Rodd v. Verage, I77 Wis., 295, paragraph 9 of the

syllabus, states that a judgment adjudging one violating an injunction
guilty of contempt and sentencing him to imprisonment is a final judgment and not a mere order, and a writ of error would lie whether the
proceedings were civil or criminfal. 11
Would not any finding of contempt and a sentence thereon be a
judgment and not a mere order, even though it was not based on the
violation of an injunction? Suppose it were for failure to appear as
a witness or in response to an order of a court commissioner or for
refusal to testify? If it is a judgment and not a mere order, can such
judgment be entered by a court commissioner, or by a judge in vacation ?
POLICY OF COURTS AS TO CONTEMPTS

"The power to punish for contempt, in which in a measure the
magistrate sits as prosecutor, judge and jury, while necessary and essential for a proper upholding of the power and the dignity of a court
of justice, is nevertheless one to be sparingly used." I 'am quoting
Justice Eschweiler in his dissenting opinion in State ex rel. Rodd v.
Verage, 177 Wis., 295, 341.
Speaking of criminal contempts, he says: "Though a creation of
the common law and existing from the time whereof the memory
and reading of man runneth not to the contrary, yet in England,
the home of the common law, it is very seldom resorted to, for as
stated in Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S., 604, 611, 612, (34 Sup.
Ct. 693), "The English courts seem to think it wise, even when there
is much seeming reason for the exercise of a summary "power, to leave
the punishment of this class of contempts to the regular and formal
criminal process." (P. 341.)
WHETHER CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS ARE CIVIL OR CRIMINAL

In Emerson v. Huss, 127 Wis., 215, decided in 19o6, the court says:"The statutes preserve a marked distinction in the remedies they afford
and the procedure to be followed in each class." Also that the decisions of the court involving these statutes show a considerable con"In re Remi0gton, 7 Wis., 643.
1' See p. 318 citing State ex rel Jackson v. Reid 174 Wis., 536.
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trariety of opinion as to their construction and scope. The court says,
however, that in the application of the statutes to the cases actually
presented, with certain exceptions noted, the decisions rendered are in
substantial harmony. The court says as to criminal contempts the
proceeding is to be prosecuted in the name of the State. (p. 223.)
If the defendant is adjudicated guilty punishment by fine or imprisonment, or both, may be imposed, within the limits provided; and, if
imprisonment is imposed, the commitment must specify the particular
circumstances of the offense. The court also says there is no question
but that the moneys paid as fines go to the school fund as in criminal
prosecutions, and that if imprisonment be ordered it is a commitment
as a punishment for a criminal offense.
Justice Doerfler, however, in his dissenting opinion in State ex rel
Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis., 295, on p. 347 (decided in 1922) says:
The writer cannot agree with what is said in Emerson v. Huss, 127
Wis., 215 that the fine under a proceeding for remedial relief shall be
paid to the state treasurer for the benefit of the school fund. It would
stamp it as a criminal proceeding, and under such holding the civil
and the criminal proceeding would be so blended as to involve both an
appeal and a writ of error in the same case.
Justice Owen says: "One who is prosecuted for contempt is en' 12
titled to know whether the proceeding is civil or criminal.
In Emerson v. Huss, 127 Wis., 215, p. 224, the court says that in
proceedings to punish as for a contempt under Chapter 150 (now Chapter 295 relating to civil contempts) much confusion has arisen from
attempts to restrict the scope of the statute by limiting the remedy
under it to an indemnity of the injured party in his private rights
by a recovery of his money loss or injury, and by coercing performance of a duty unperformed, owing to the injured party, and still
within the power of the contemnor to perform. They say that the provisions, however, plainly authorize the court to punish by fine and imprisonment all acts of misconduct, though the misconduct may not
pertain to the performance of a duty still within the power of the contemnor to perform and though it may produce no actual loss or injury.
(p. 224.)
No good reason is perceived why, in protecting the rights
of parties in civil actions, a money penalty or imprisonment may not
appropriately be visited on the offender in civil proceedings, even
though it appears that no actual pecuniary loss has resulted to the
parties. (p. 225.)
We perceive no reason why the money paid by the contemnor may
not very properly be turned over to the school fund of the State. (p.
13
225.)
We discover no force in 'the claim that this will result in a
'State ex rel Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis., 295 on pp. 316, 317.
Emerson v. Huss, 127 Wis., 215.
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blending of proceedings to punish contempts in civil actions with those
authorized for the punishment of contempts criminally. The two classes
of proceedngs seek to reach entirely different objects and are subject
to wholly different procedures; the one having all the characteristics
and incidents of a civil proceeding, while the other has those of a criminal prosecution in the name of the state.
Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Humphrey, 132 Wis. 587, decided in 1907 follows
Emerson v. Huss. Justice Winslow on p. 59014 says it is a civil proceeding.
Where it is desired to punish an act as a criminal contempt, the proceeding should be brought in the name of the state.....
.There
are
doubtless some acts which are civil as well as criminal contempts .....
The wilful disobedience of an order of the court by a party to the action would seem to be such an act if the rights or remedies of the opposing party are injured or prejudiced thereby .....
.In such case
the form in which the proceeding is brought will necessarily determine
its character.
In State ex rel Rodd v. Verage, 127 Wis., 295, the application was
to punish for criminal contempt. The court, however, ruled that the
proceeding was under Chapter i5o relating to civil contempts. (p. 315,
316.)
Justice Eschweiler in his dissenting opinion says it is clear that the
proceedings were for a criminal contempt and punitive solely.
As to the necessary finding see Emerson v. Huss, 127 Wis., 215, p.
228, 229. In this case the contempt orders were set aside as invalid
for want of proper findings. (p. 229.)
In 1912 the same questions were considered in Stollenwerk v. Klevenow, I51 Wis., 355. The order made had failed to comply with the requirements of Emerson v. Huss' 5 in some important respects. (p. 360,
361.) The failure to do so was held to be overcome by reason of the
passage of section 3072 m of the statutes, 8 which provides that "No
judgment shall be reversed in any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, for error as to any matter of procedure, unless in the opinion of
the court to which the application is made, after an examination of the
entire action or proceeding, it shall appear -that the error complained of
has affected the substantial rights of the party seeking to reverse the
judgment."
In his dissenting opinion in State ex rel Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis.,
295, Justice Doerfler on p. 342 quotes from In re Pierce, 44 Wis. 411,
423:

" Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Humphrey, 132 Wis., 587.
'Emerson v. Huss, 127 Wis., 215.
" Laws of 19o9, Ch. 192.
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The fin'al order in contempt proceedings must be one thing or the
other; it must impose criminal punishment for the misconduct, or
enforce the civil remedy by awarding indemnity. It cannot do both.
. .

..

This conclusion of the court in the Pierce case1 has never been

modified or receded from, unless the holding in Emerson v. Huss, 127
Wis., 215 can be so construed. Great confusion has arisen in this
court from a construction of Chapter 117 of the statutes, involving
purely criminal contempts, and Chapter 15o entitled "Proceedings to
punish contempts to protect the rights of parties in civil actions." The
offenses contemplated by Chapter 15o involve criminal contempts in
each instance, as much so as do the offenses referred to in Chapter
117; the only distinction between the two sets of offenses consisting
of the fact that Chapter 117 refers to what are known as purely criminal contempts, viz. violations 'against the dignity and authority of the
court, and therefore an affront against the administration of justice,
while those included in Chapter 15o contain all of the elements of the
offenses referred to in Chapter 117, are fully as serious in their nature and consequences, have a like effect upon the dignity and standing
of the court, and equally interfere with the proper administration of
justice; but, in addition to all of the foregoing, the contemnor has been
guilty of something which is calculated to or actually does defeat, impede, or prejudice the rights or remedies of a party in an action or
proceeding in a court.
Justice Doerfier then reviews the statutes relating to contempts in
civil actions and seems to conclude that it is the punishment inflicted
that determines whether it was for a civil or criminal contempt.
He whole heartedly approves the decision of the Federal Supreme
Court in Gompers v. Bucks S. & R. Co., 221 U. S. 418, 441, 443, 31
Sup. Ct. 492 stating:
This decision is a crystallization of ,the judicial wisdom of the ages
by the highest court of the greatest country in the world. No vested
property rights or interests have resulted from any judicial holding
upon the subject of contempt, and we are therefore at liberty to adopt
the reasoning in the Gompers case. (P. 349, 350.)
The latest case Wetzler v. Glassner, 185 Wis. 593 was decided in
1925. Therein the court says: "The real character of the proceeding is
to be determined by the relief sought." (p. 506.) The contempt proceedings were brought under Chapter 295, statutes, entitled "Contempts
in civil actions." The court says that while the proceeding is denominated a civil contempt and the procedure is that prescribed in Chapter
295, nevertheless it was in the nature of a proceeding for criminal
contempt. (PP. 595, 596-)
CIRCUIT COURT RULES

The Circuit Court rules adopted by the Supreme Court in 19o6,
as amended, are published in the second volume of the statutes.
'" In

re Pierce, 44 Wis., 411, 423.
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Rule 27 relates to creditors' actions, supplemental proceedings and
receivers. Sec. 4 of Rule 27 reads in part: "No injunction granted in
such action or proceeding shall be construed to prevent the debtor
from receiving and applying the proceeds of his subsequent earnings
to the support of himself or -his family, etc."
It would seem that the debtor should have the same right to apply
present earnings in his possession to the support of himself and family, referring of course to earnings reasonably necessary in amount for
that purpose. Otherwise he would be forced to rely on public or
private charity or further credit for support of himself and family.
Perhaps the exemption statute as to exemption of earnings should be
considered to determine whether or not the amount already spent by
him, together with the amotint on hand is within the exemption limits.
Separate rules of circuit judges for the second circuit are also published. Of these rules 22 to 27 relate to rules of practice before court
commissioners in Milwaukee County.
Rule 25 reads:
Should the debtor fail to appear at the time fixed by the order for
his examination, no warrant of attachment shall issue against him until
after the judgment creditor or his attorney files an affidavit showing
cause and procures an order from the commissioner requiring the
judgment debtor to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt for his failure to 'appear, which order shall be duty served
on the judgment debtor and shall be made returnable at a time specified
in said order; except it be made to appear by affidavit filed with commissioner after the debtor's failure to appear that good cause exists
for the immediate issue of a warrant of attachment.
The rule just stated contemplates that the order to show cause be
made returnable 'before the commissioner and commissioners are now
acting upon it. Likewise the rule contemplates that the warrant of
attachment be made returnable to the commissioner.
If I am -correct in my construction of the various sections of Chapter
295 of the statutes heretofore cited, then the order to show cause and
warrant of attachment should be returnable to the court and rule 25
is in conflict with the statutes.
Further, if the original order to appear before the commissioner also
forbids a transfer of property and there is a violation by some disposition of property, or spending of money, any contempt involved
therein is not punishable by the commissioner, but by the court.
I quote from Winslow's Forms, the two-volume work on Pleading
and Practice under the Code. In the chapter on contempt proceedings
he states that in Minnesota no distinction is preserved by the statutes
between civil and criminal contempt proceedings; but contempts are
divided into direct contempts, which are those committed in the im-
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mediate view and presence of the court, and may be punished summarily without process or proof; and constructive contempts, which are
those not committed within the immediate presence of the court. A
prosecution for -constructive contempt is begun by affidavit to be followed by warrant of arrest or order to show cause. Punishment is by
imprisonment or fine or both, and by imposition of an indemnity to be
paid for any actual loss to the injured party. 18
In Iowa contempt proceedings are criminal in their nature. If the
contempt be committed in the presence of the court it may be punished summarily, but if not the proceedings must be based on affidavit
and rule to show cause.
In Nebraska the proceedings are -held to be in their nature criminal,
direct when committed in presence of the court and constructive when
not so committed. Proceedings for constructive contempts must be
commenced by information under oath or affidavit stating positively all
the necessary facts, as in a prosecution for crime.
The North Dakota statutes and procedure are similar to Wisconsin.
It seems to me that it would be worth while to consider whether
or not the Wisconsin statutes can be simplified, thereby tending to eliminate the confusion existing in the decisions attempting to construe the
statutes.
It would seem that Minnesota has the right idea about the matter.
The question might be considered by the local bar associations and
by the state bar association.
" Winslow's

Forms Vol.

2, p. 1217.

